Christine B. Burgon v. Burnell H. Burgon : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Christine B. Burgon v. Burnell H. Burgon : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig T. Jacobsen; attorney for appellee.
Craig S. Cook; attorney for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Christine B. Burgon v. Burnell H. Burgon, No. 960137 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/98






DOCKETNO. q i « 0 l 3 ^ C f l 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINE B. BURGON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
BURNELL H. BURGON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 960137-CA 
Category No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Decree of Divorce of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
CRAIG T. JACOBSEN 
215 State Street, 12th Floor 
P. O. Box 50120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
CRAIG S. COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 







IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINE B. BURGON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
BURNELL H. BURGON, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No- 960137-CA 
Category No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Decree of Divorce of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
CRAIG T. JACOBSEN 
215 State Street, 12th Floor 
P. 0. Box 50120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
CRAIG S. COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO MAKE 
PROPER FINDINGS BASED UPON THE REQUIRED 
FACTORS FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY 3 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE 
AWARDED DEFENDANT INTEREST ON HIS 
EQUITABLE LIEN 7 
POINT III. NO ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE 




Carter v. Carter, 
584 P,2d 904 (Utah 1978) 8 
Coleman v. Coleman, 
743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) 2 
Peck v. Peck, 
738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987) 2 
STATUTES CITED 
§15-1-4, U.C.A 7 
§30-3-5(7) (a) , U.C.A 6 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINE B. BURGON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
Case No. 960137-CA 
Category No. 15 
BURNELL H. BURGON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following response is filed by appellant Burnell Burgon 
to the Brief of appellee Christine Burgon dated October 17, 
1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee Christine Burgon has assumably presented the facts 
most favorably to her position in support of the lower court's 
Decree of Divorce. See Appellee's Statement of Facts, pp. 4-9. 
Her statements, however, are mere conclusions completely 
unsupported by any factual findings either in the transcript, 
the court's oral ruling, or the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. For example, Appellee notes that "Mr. Burgon's income 
is approximately three times higher than Ms. Burgon's income." 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 6). "Mr. Burgon clearly has the ability 
to pay alimony." (Id. at 7). "The trial court found that Ms. 
Burgon's monthly expenses exceeded her ability to provide for 
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their needs." (R. 170). "The trial court also specifically 
found that Mr. Burgon had the ability to pay alimony. (R. 
170) ." (Id^ at 8). 
Appellee has been unable to cite any specific references to 
facts and figures relating to the necessary living expenses of 
Ms. Burgon and the available income that Mr. Burgon has after 
all necessary expenses have been deducted. It should also be 
kept in mind that the Findings were drafted by Appellee's own 
counsel and therefore any deficiency should be interpreted 
against the drafter. Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 
(Utah App. 1987); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
During the Argument portion of her brief, Appellee fares no 
better. Appellee notes that the trial court reviewed the 
expenses of both parties and found that some of Ms. Burgon1s 
expenses were excessive or inappropriate. No trial reference is 
made as to which expense categories were being struck or which 
entertainment expenses were being rejected by the court. 
Appellee simply parrots the previous assumptions by stating that 
"[T]he trial court found that Ms. Burgon*s monthly expenses 
exceed her ability to provide for her needs. Thus, the trial 
court considered Ms. Burgonfs financial condition, the first 
factor of the applicable statute." (Appellee's Brief at 11). 
As to Mr. Burgon*s ability to pay, Appellee summarily 
asserts: 
The record also reveals that the trial court 
considered the third factor, Mr. Burgon's ability to 
provide support. The trial court entered a finding 
that Mr. Burgon earned $4,643 per month. The Court 
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expressly found that Mr. Burgon had the ability to 
pay alimony. Id. at 12. 
Again, Mr. Burgon1s income alone does not satisfy the third 
factor of Jones since his legitimate expenses are a critical 
factor in this analysis. 
From these examples contained in Appellee's own brief, it 
can be assumed that there exists neither evidence nor findings 
sufficient to justify the present alimony award. This 
deficiency requires a remand in order to allow the trial court 
the opportunity to fill in these vital gaps. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO MAKE PROPER 
FINDINGS BASED UPON THE REQUIRED 
FACTORS FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
Appellee states that Mr. Burgon failed to address Section 
30-3-5(7), Utah Code Annotated, in his Brief and that the case 
law cited by Mr. Burgon "predates the controlling statutory law 
under this new section." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 10-11). 
Appellant acknowledges that this statute was not discussed in 
his opening brief. Quite simply, the statute was never part of 
the trial in this case as is evidenced by the fact that none of 
the Courtfs rulings ever refer to it. The new statute became 
effective in May of 1995. This case went to trial in July of 
1995. For whatever reason, neither the parties nor the court 
relied upon this statute in the decision. 
If this statute is materially different from the "predated" 
case law relied upon by the parties during the divorce, then an 
additional reason for remand now exists to allow the trial court 
to properly apply the new statute. On the other hand, any 
references made by Appellee to its various provisions is 
irrelevant to this appeal if this statute is not applicable to 
this case because of the time sequence of the marriage and 
pretrial proceedings or if the statute makes no substantial 
difference in the prior case law of this state. 
It would seem, however, that the main arguments advanced by 
Appellant in his opening brief are equally applicable with or 
without this newly enacted statute. Both subsection 1 and 3 
require the same analysis and findings as the factors contained 
in the Jones criteria. The remaining criteria contained in the 
statute such as the length of the couple's marriage, the degree 
of fault, and the equalization of respective standards of living 
are additional conditions not specifically required by prior 
case law and not addressed by the parties or the court. Again, 
if they apply to this case, then a remand will allow the court 
to examine them. If they do not apply to this case, then the 
arguments advanced by Appellee relating to these subsections 
should be stricken as irrelevant to the issus of this case. See 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-15. 
Appellee has argued that even assuming that the trial court 
failed to enter adequate findings to support the alimony award 
that this court should nevertheless affirm the award "because 
the clear, uncontroverted record establishes as a matter of law 
that the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon was not an abuse of the 
trial court's discretionary power." (Appellee's Brief at 12). 
Mr. Burgon counters this assertion with his previous observation 
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that the total record in this case is so lacking as to necessary 
information that neither this Court nor the trial court could 
make an intelligent award of alimony without further 
supplementation and clarification. 
Appellee has cited no cases in which this Court has 
actually chosen to make an award of alimony itself when an 
inadequate factual record exists. Appellee relies upon Bell 
v. Bell for this "matter of law" argument. (Appelleefs Brief 
at 10, 12). The Bell case, ironically litigated by 
Appellant's present attorney, resulted in a remand on the very 
basis of inadeqate findings as to the needs of either party and 
the ability to pay by the husband. 
Appellee also relies upon Asper v. Asper (Appellee's 
Brief at 15) but again this Court remanded because there was 
"insufficient data in the Findings of Fact or the undisputed 
evidence to establish how much alimony is required." 753 P.2d at 
980. The Court further stated: 
[T]he Findings of Fact are insufficient to 
determine Mrs. Asper's financial needs, sources, and 
amounts of income in addition to her salary, if any, 
or Mr. Asper's ability to provide support—all 
required findings for an award of alimony. Nor is 
the record so clear as to allow us to determine that 
need ourselves....We, therefore, remand to the trial 
court for additional findings and determination of an 
appropriate amount of alimony. 753 P.2d at 981. 
The record in this matter is inadequate to permit this 
Court to enter an alimony award as a matter of law. However, if 
any such award is to be made by this Court, it should be to 
substantially reduc the present obligation of Appellant. Mr. 
Burgon in his opening Brief reviewed the evidence he presented 
to the lower court showing the dire financial state he was being 
put into with the present monetary award of $1,050 alimony per 
month. (Appellant's opening Brief, pp. 4-6). These assertions 
have not been countered by Appellee. Instead, she has relied 
upon the difference in their various incomes and earning ability 
to justify this award without taking into consideration the 
obligations that Mr. Burgon incurred as a result of this 
divorce. No mention is made that he is in a higher taxable 
income bracket, that he has many of the financial obligations of 
the marriage, that he must make child support and alimony 
payments, that he must pay therapy and medical obligations of 
Ms. Burgon and the children, and that he has had to pay his own 
legal fees and those of Ms. Burgon. Appellee has not refuted 
Mr. Burgonfs contention that he cannot financially survive with 
these obligations. 
Even Appellee's mathematics are defective. In attempting 
to rely upon Section 30-3-5(7)(a), U.C.A. Appellee makes the 
following statement: 
Based upon the alimony award to Ms. Burgon, Ms. 
Burgon will have income of approximately $2,600 per 
month. [fn. 1, $1050 monthly alimony and $1,566 
monthly income total approximately $2,600 per month]. 
Subtracting $1,050 from Mr. Burgon*s monthly income 
of $4,043 leaves him with a monthly income of almost 
$3,600, still a much higher income than Ms. Burgon1s. 
Based upon the guidelines of Section 30-3-5(7)(d), 
the alimony award is extremely reasonable. 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 15). 
Appellee has conveniently omitted in this calculation the 
court-ordered monthly child support obligation. If that is 
factored in then Ms. Burgon1s monthly income is presently $3,460 
whereas Mr. Burgon's monthly income becomes $2,733 which is $700 
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lower than Ms. Burgon's income. 
It is for these reasons that the lower court must carefully 
consider not only the gross income of both parties but also 
their respective obligations and necessary expenses for a 
reasonable lifestyle. Neither party in this case will enjoy a 
luxurious or extravagant way of life. However, it is the 
function and duty of the lower court to try to utilize the 
available assets of the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
for both of them to continue and rebuild their lives. The lower 
court has failed to do this and therefore a remand with 
directions is required to allow both parties to present their 
respective arguments and to receive a decision which is based 
upon concrete facts and not speculative conclusions. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED 
DEFENDANT INTEREST ON HIS EQUITABLE 
LIEN. 
Appellee maintains that "Mr. Burgon's position has 
previously been rejected by this Court in Osquthorpe v. 
Osguthorpe." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 16-17). This assertion is 
incorrect. In Osguthorpe the appellant argued that Section 
15-1-4, U.C.A. required that legal interest accrue as to the 
amount of his equitable lien until the sale of the family 
residence. This Court correctly noted that this statutory 
section only applies to legal judgments. Here, Mr. Burgon is 
not asserting that he is entitled to interest under the terms of 
the legal interest statute. Rather, he is requesting that under 
the divorce court's power of equity that an award of interest be 
made in order to allow him some small income from the loss of 
this major sum of money tied up in Ms. Burgon1s home for 
conceivably many years into the future. 
Appellee argues that it is not right for Mr. Burgon to only 
seek a review of one aspect of the total court award when Ms. 
Burgon is herself unhappy with various other provisions made by 
the lower court. (Appellee's Brief at 17). This argument is 
misplaced. As a matter of right during an appeal, either party 
may request a review of specific provisions of a divorce decree. 
Certainly, Mr. Burgon could also have complained about matters 
other than those contained in his opening brief. However, he 
chose to limit this appeal to those issues which he feels are 
particularly unjust. Ms. Burgon had the same right and 
opportunity to cross appeal had she felt that other aspects of 
the divorce decree were unfair to her. She chose not to do so 
and has now waived any right to complain about Mr. Burgon1s 
exercise of appellate review. 
POINT III 
NO ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO 
MS. BURGON AS A RESULT OF THIS APPEAL. 
Assuming that Mr. Burgon prevails in this appeal and that 
this matter is remanded for further consideration or the alimony 
award is reduced as a matter of law, an award of attorneys1 fees 
is inappropriate. For this reason, therefore, any claim for 
additional attorneys' fees should be denied. See Carter v. 
Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, as is often the case in divorce actions, 
both parties were forced to employ lawyers to present their 
respective positions before the trial judge. Neither of those 
lawyers are present during this appeal. It can be safely said, 
however, that both attorneys in the lower court presented 
voluminous information to the lower court regarding the claimed 
expenses and income of their own clients as well as disputing 
the evidence of their opponent. The lower court judge failed to 
decide what evidence would be accepted and what would be 
rejected. She completely failed to make the type of required 
findings needed to support an award of alimony which could be a 
monthly obligation of Appellant for the next 21 years. 
This award of a potentially huge sum of money must contain 
a clear factual basis for the benefit of the parties and for 
appropriate appellate review. This was not done here and 
therefore a remand is required under the numerous cases decided 
by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. During a remand, the 
question of the newly enacted alimony statute can also be raised 
as to whether it is appliable to this case and, if so, how it 
affects any award. If this Court believes it can decide the 
alimony amount as a matter of law, then a substantial reduction 
should be ordered based upon the expenses that Appellant must 
incur each month. 
The interest on the equitable lien of Mr. Burgon is also a 
matter which can be resolved by this Court or remanded to the 
lower court for further consideration. Again, Petitioner only 
seeks an equitable outcome to this unfortunate separation. 
Finally, attorneys1 fees should not be awarded to Appellee 
if this matter is remanded or alimony reduced. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of November, 1996 
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